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Abstract
In this paper, we examine the preferences for international redistribution using
unique data from Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Generalized Social
Surveys (GSS). We find low rates of private giving to international aid organizations.
In addition, most U.S. households suport reducing foreign aid rather than increasing
assitance to other countries. We investigate two main explanations: (1) households
may prefer low levels of both private and public giving to international aid organiza-
tions and support for global public goods (2) Perceptions of high levels of government
giving crowd out private contributions towards global public goods and international
aid.
1. Introduction
A central question is whether households in rich countries support increased funding for
international aid. Currently, about 1.6 billion people— one fifth of the world’s population
live in absolute poverty. In the U.S., registered international organizations that focus on
development assistance make up 2 percent of all charitable organizations, and this sector
appears to be growing more rapidly than other nonprofit organization categories. Although
there has been a growing call for more greater oﬃcial development assistance to developing
countries, a survey of OECD countries shows that oﬃcial development assistance (ODA) to
developing countries has been around 0.2 to 0.4 percent, some $100 billion short of amounts
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pledged by global leaders. In the United States, oﬃcial development assistance as a fraction
of GDP remains among the lowest among industrialized nations in the world.
In this paper, we investigate preferences towards international redistribution. To our
knowledge, this is the one of the first studies to investigate preferences for international
redistribution. We develop a model of private transfers where households choose their
private contributions towards international aid and support for oﬃcial development as-
sistance based on their preferences, endowments and perceptions of oﬃcial development
assistance. To date, much of the existing literature examines support for welfare and other
forms of domestic redistribution. There is very little known about international redistri-
bution. However, we draw on the well-established body of work on domestic preferences
for redistribution. Within this literature, there are two key sources of preference formation
towards income redistribution. Households support income redistribution because they are
low-income households and can benefit from government redistribution, or they favor redis-
tribution as a means to insure against income shocks.
We draw on new longitudinal household-level data on private contributions towards
international aid from the 2001 and 2003 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID). According to a representative survey of the US population, only four percent of
all households surveyed have given to an international aid organization with an average
contribution amount of 7.5 dollars in 2002. When we multiply the average donation amount
with the number of households (100 million) in US, approximately $750 million was donated
to international aid organizations. According to the same survey, 42 percent of households
have contributed to a religious organization with an average contribution amount of 715
dollars. This amounts to about $71.5 billion of donations to religious organizations. This
represents a striking contrast between the low levels of private giving to international aid
organizations in the US.
We analyze the individual determinants of private contributions to international aid
organizations using newly available data from PSID. Individual characteristics provide part
of the explanation for giving behavior to international aid organizations. We examine the
individual determinants of support for international aid and perceptions of the level of gov-
ernment transfers for international aid using data from Generalized Social Surveys (GSS).
We also turn our attention to the role of government transfers in explaining the private
giving behavior. According to models of charitable giving, government transfers may crowd
out private contributions if government transfers and private contributions are substitutes in
the production of goods that benefit international aid recipients. We then analyze whether
in U.S. metropolitan areas and counties where the level of central government international
aid transfers are perceived to be high have lower levels of private giving. The level of pri-
vate giving may be inversely correlated with the perceived level of government transfers (
international aid) giving for two reasons: (1) households may prefer low (high) levels of
both private and public giving to international aid organizations and support for global
public goods (2) Perceptions of high levels of government giving may crowd out private
contributions towards global public goods and international aid.
To further investigate the factors that can explain preferences toward private giving to
international aid and support for global public goods, we examine several additional expla-
nations. One candidate explanation that we explore is the role of one’s social environment
in influencing attitudes towards households in developing countries. To capture this eﬀect,
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we include the fraction of a community that is foreign born. Between 1990 and 2005, the
fraction of the foreign born in the U.S. population increased from 5 percent to close to 12
percent. Unlike past waves of immigration, recent immigrants are more likely to come
from developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. We examine the hypothesis
that recent inflows of immigrants may influence attitudes and preferences towards inter-
national redistribution. Our approach is informed by a number of studies that document
that exposure to the poor greatly impact support for domestic redistribution. Luttmer
(2001) finds that support for welfare in the U.S. is characterized by a negative exposure
eﬀect in which individuals decrease their support for welfare as the welfare recipiency rate
in their community rises, and racial group loyalty in that individuals increase their support
for welfare spending as the share of local recipients from their own racial group rises.
2. Model
In this section, we model the household’s decision to contribute to an international aid
organization. The model has two main features: First, it allows both self-interested and
inter-household preferences to aﬀect the household’s contribution decision. Second, it en-
ables us to investigate the eﬀects of government involvement on private contributions.
Consider a household i that makes a monetary transfer, di to a community organiza-
tion. We assume that there are N households in the community, such that i ∈ {1, ..., N}.
International aid organizations provide services that can be enjoyed by all households such
as global public goods but mostly lower income individuals outside of the country.1
The utility to household i, Ui is given by
Ui = UiS + UiA (2.1)
where UiS is the utility from self-interest and UiA is the utility from altruism towards others.
The utility of household i from self interest is given by
UiS = wi (yi)Sαi + c
β
i (2.2)
where S denotes the global public good obtained from the international aid organization,
wi is the weight that household i0s places on the global public good, wi (yi) < 1, and it
may be an increasing or decreasing function of income and ci is private consumption. We
assume that utility is concave in the public good, and in the consumption good such that
αi, β ∈ (0, 1) .2
Household i may also care about the utility of others. Such interpersonal eﬀects can
manifest themselves as altruism, including the utility of others in the household’s objective
function. The utility of household i from altruism is given by
UiA = wij (Xi,Xj)UjS (2.3)
where wij (Xi,Xj) ≥ 0 denotes the weight that household i places on the utility (from self-
interest) of representative household j and UjS is household j0s utility from self-interest. Xi
1Neighborhood security, neighborhood improvement are examples of such services. Community organi-
zations may also provide excludable services such as health care and access to credit.
2 In addition, we assume that income of the median voter is not too large so that at equilibrium, she will
not be the sole contributor towards the public good.
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and Xj are the characteristics of households i and j respectively. We will refer to household
j as the foreign household and assume that wj = 1. Note that this assumption implies that
foreign household always values the global public good more than the local household
The consumption of the private good, ci is equal to unearned income, yi, less the op-
portunity cost of transfers to the community organization,
ci = yi − di − τ (yi, di) (2.4)
τ (yi, di) is the income tax, τdi (yi, di) is the marginal tax rate and τdi (yi, di) = −τyi (yi, di)
The timing is as follows: (1) Households make their monetary contributions to the
international aid organization, and (2) The international aid organization produces global
public good.
The services produced by the international aid organization depend on total amount of
private contributions, government involvement, and costs of production. We model the
production of services as follows:
S = f


NX
i=1
di,G

wi, wij ,
NX
j=1
τ (yj , dj)



 (2.5)
where dj denotes the money contributions of household j to the organization, G denotes the
level of government involvement through monetary transfers. wi and wij are the weights
that median voter places on the global public good and the utility of the foreign household
respectively. We assume that G is an increasing function of wi and wij . We assume that
services are increasing in the level of household contributions and government transfers
(f1 > 0, f2 >, f3 > 0). In addition, the production function is assumed to be concave in
household transfers.
We now solve the model using backward induction. Household i chooses its level of
contributions based on this assumption and solves the following problem:
max
di
Ui = wiSαi + (yi − di − τ (yi, di))β + wij (Xi,Xj)wjSαj (2.6)
The household’s first order condition with respect to di is given by£
αiwiSαi−1 + wij (Xi,Xj)wjαjSαj−1
¤
(f1 + f2Gττdi)−(1 + τdi)β (yi − di − τ (yi, di))
β−1 = 0
(2.7)
We assume that the average tax rate is atr, τ (yi, di) = atr (yi − di) marginal tax rate is
mtr=τyi (yi, di) = −τdi (yi, di) . First order condition becomes£
αiwiSαi−1 + wij (Xi,Xj)wjαjSαj−1
¤
(f1 − f2Gτmtr)−(1−mtr)β (yi − di − τ (yi, di))β−1 = 0
sign∂di∂yi
= sign


£
αi (αi − 1)wiSαi−2 +wij (Xi,Xj)wjαj (αj − 1)Sαj−1
¤
(f2Gττyi) (f1 + f2Gττdi)
+
£
αiwiSαi−1 + wij (Xi,Xj)wjαjSαj−1
¤ ¡
f12 − f22G2ττyiτdi − f2Gττmtr2 − f2Gττyiyi
¢
...


sign∂di∂G = sign
Ã £
αi (αi − 1)wiSαi−2 + wij (Xi,Xj)wjαj (αj − 1)Sαj−1
¤O
f2 (f1 − f2Gτmtr) +
£
αiwiSαi−1 + wij (Xi,Xj)wjαjSαj−1
¤
(f12 − f22mtr)
!
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******Assuming that ∂G∂yi =
∂G
∂di = 0, first order condition is£
αiwiSαi−1 + wij (Xi,Xj)wjαjSαj−1
¤
f1 − (1−mtr)β (yi − di − τ (yi, di))β−1 = 0
Comparative statics are:
sign∂di∂yi
= sign
µ
αiw0i (yi)Sαi−1f1 + τyy (yi, di)β (yi − di − τ (yi, di))
β−1−
(1−mtr)β (β − 1) (1 +mtr)
¶
The third term in the above equation is positive. The second term is likely to be positive.
The first term is positive if w0i (yi) > 0.
sign∂di∂G = sign
µ £
αi (αi − 1)wiSαi−2 + wij (Xi,Xj)wjαj (αj − 1)Sαj−1
¤
f1f2+£
αiwiSαi−1 + wij (Xi,Xj)wjαjSαj−1
¤
f12
¶
If household transfers and government transfers are substitutes then ∂diF∂G < 0. If on the
other hand, they are complements, sign of ∂diF∂G of is ambiguous.
3. Data
3.1. Data on Private Giving to International Organizations
In this study, we define charitable giving to international purposes as contributions to qual-
ified nonprofit international aid organizations that are eligible for the charitable deduction
according to the definitions provided by the Internal Revenue Service. We draw on a new
module in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics PSID. The philanthropy module used in
this paper is unique because it provides high-quality data on charitable giving, comparable
to the U.S. Individual Taxpayer Return data (Wilhelm, 2002). Most existing data sources
on U.S. charitable giving do not provide detailed information on charitable giving and high
quality information on income and wealth is often unavailable.
The key dependent variable in our study is charitable giving to international aid orga-
nizations. The measure of giving to international aid organizations is constructed using the
following question, which was posed to PSID survey respondents: “During the year 2000,
did [you/you or anyone in your family] donate money, assets, or property with a combined
value of more than $25 to a charitable organization that served the following purposes:
international aid or world peace? We examine “giving” as dichotomous variable, which is
equal to 1 if individual i gave a transfer to a charitable organization that focused on inter-
national aid or world peace in the survey year, and 0 otherwise. In the 2003 PSID data, we
can also investigate the amount transferred, a continuous variable, which is defined as the
log of the total monetary contribution to an international aid organization.
The data set provides a comprehensive picture of the individual and community environ-
ment for over 5400 households. In particular, the PSID has a rich set of income and wealth
measures, which we exploit in order to fully capture the household’s economic position.
As permanent income tends to have a larger eﬀect on charitable behavior than transitory
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income sources (Auten, Holger-Sieg, and Clotfelter, 2002), we use a measure of the house-
hold’s permanent income. The measure of permanent income is based on average family
income from 1997, 1999, and 2001 waves of the PSID.
In the analysis, we also include several individual household characteristics, such as age
of household head, age squared, marital status, gender, educational attainment, race and
ethnic origin, family size, unemployment status, immigrant status, and household income.
To account for regional variation in charitable giving, we classify households into six geo-
graphic regions based on their state of residence. Given the tax-deductibility of charitable
contributions, higher marginal tax rates should lower the price of charitable giving. The
price of formal charitable giving is calculated by 1 minus the marginal tax rate for item-
izers and unity for non-itemizers. We calculate the marginal tax rate for itemizers using
TAXSIM version 5 (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993). We also include individual attributes that
may aﬀect international redistribution including trusting attitudes towards others available
in the 1968-1972 waves of the PSID and data on recent migration.
To obtain measures of the foreign born and other community characteristics, we rely on
the 1990 and 2000 Census Data. The United States has witnessed significant changes in
immigration over the past two decades. Between 1990 and 2000, the foreign-born popula-
tion in the United States grew by 57% to 31 million people. Today, at least one in nine
U.S. residents is foreign born. Because a growing share of immigrants come from countries
in Africa, Asia and Latin America, immigration is also shaping U.S. demographic trends.
According to the 2000 U.S. Census, approximately 30 percent of the U.S. population cur-
rently belongs to a racial or ethnic minority group. Using the 1990 and 2000 Integrated
Public Use Microdata Sample (IPUMS) and 1990 and 2000 U.S. Census Summary File 3,
we construct measures of population, income, and the fraction of the population that is
foreign born.
Table 1 provides summary statistics. Table 1 provides summary statistics from the PSID
and CPS. The fraction of households that contribute to international aid organizations is
small. From our data, only 3 percent of households report donating to an international
aid organization. In contrast, a large fraction of households donate to U.S. charitable
organization (over 60 percent of our sample). In the 2003 data, conditional on giving, the
average amount contributed was about $250. As a percentage of total giving, households
contribute about 1 percent of the total charitable giving to international aid organizations.
We should note that nearly 30 percent of households contributed money or materials to a
charitable organization that served the needy. The PSID data also allows us to examine
the allocation of charitable contributions across other categories of giving and in the results
section we discuss some findings on the incidence and levels of giving for six categories
of charitable institutions: religious institutions, organizations that served a combination
of purposes (such as the United Way), organizations that serve the needy, health care or
medical research organizations, educational, and other charitable institutions.
3.2. Data on Support for International Aid
An important question in our analysis is the extent to which households support interna-
tional redistribution. Because oﬃcial development assistance is an important component
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of international redistribution, we also consider support for public international aid. To
study this question, we rely on the General Social Surveys (GSS) which have been conducted
by the National Opinion Research Center annually since 1972, and biennially beginning in
1994.3 The main goal of the GSS data is to survey U.S. households on a range of topics in-
cluding attitudes towards social mobility and government spending. Although the content
of each GSS survey may vary slightly over time, nearly every survey has contained questions
about the extent to which households support public international aid. The GSS contains a
standard ’core’ of demographic and economic variables including household income levels,
educational attainment, race and ethnicity, immigrant status and other variables. We
focus on the 2000-2004 waves of the GSS to allow us to comparability of results across
surveys.
The key variable of interest is the extent to which households support government as-
sistance to other countries. The specific question posed to GSS respondents is as follows:
"We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or
inexpensively. I’m going to name some of these problems, and for each one I’d like you to
tell me whether you think we’re spending too much money on it, too little money, or about
the right amount on assistance to other countries." In the 2000-2004 waves of the GSS,
about 8 percent report that the U.S. government is spending too little on international aid.
A large majority, over 60 percent report that the government is spending "too much" on
foreign aid, while about 20 percent report that the U.S. is spending the "right amount" on
international aid.
We have also obtained the confidential geographical files from the GSS which allow us
to link household record to county-level information from the 2000 Integrated Public Use
Microdata Sample (IPUMS) and the 2000 U.S. Census Summary File 3 County-level Data
Census on percent foreign born, population and income within a given community.
3.3. Empirical Specification
To study the impact of community characteristics on the support for foreign aid and the
incidence and amount contributed to international organizations, we estimate Probit and
Tobit models.
3.3.1. Private Contributions to International Aid Organizations
This section presents an empirical model of a household residing in a given community k
decision to contribute money, assets, or property to an organization that serves international
aid purposes . Let j index households and k index communities. We specify
Yjk = B1 +B2Xjk +B3Ck + uj + ek (3.1)
3The survey was not conducted in the following years: 1979, 1981, and 1992.
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where Yjk is, the "latent variable" in the analysis that measures the net expected utility
to household j from contributing money to charitable organizations that help the needy in
community k, Xjk represents a vector of observable and unobservable household charac-
teristics including head’s race, age, sex, marital status, years of schooling, household size,
number of children in the household, log per capita permanent income, and the share of
household’s ethnic group in the community; Ck is a vector of community characteristics
including the fraction of the foreign in the community, (log) population and (log) median
income. ejk is the error term with E[e] = 0, V ar[e] = 1.
We do not observe the "latent" variable, Yjk but only the choice made by the household,
which takes the value 1 if household contributes money to the charitable organization that
serves international aid purposes (i.e. Yjk is positive), and 0 otherwise.
Pjk = 1 if Yjk > 0, 0 otherwise
We then estimate a probit specification where the dependent variable is Pjk. The spec-
ification includes a rich set of household and community characteristics as explanatory
variables.
The dataset contains information on private giving to international aid organizations,
but it is important to recognize that money transfers realized do not capture Yjk. Economic
theory suggests that the household makes a marginal benefit-marginal cost calculation when
deciding on the level of transfers. Yjk. represents the diﬀerence between marginal benefits
and marginal costs. With this caveat in mind, we estimate a Tobit model with the total
amount of money transferred to charitable organizations as the dependent variables.
3.3.2. Support for Public International Aid
We adopt a similar specification when we examine whether a given household supports
increased government funding for international assistance.
Yjk is, the "latent variable" in the analysis that measures the net expected utility to
household j residing in community k from increased international assistance, Xjk repre-
sents a vector of observable and unobservable household characteristics including head’s
race, age, sex, marital status, years of schooling, household size, number of children in the
household, log per capita permanent income, and the share of household’s ethnic group in
the community; Ck is a vector of community characteristics including the fraction of the
foreign in the community, (log) population and (log) median income. jk is the error term
with E[] = 0, V ar[] = 1.
We do not observe the "latent" variable, Yjk but only the choice made by the household,
which takes the value 1 if household supports international aid (i.e. Yjk is positive), and 0
otherwise.
Pjk = 1 if Yjk > 0, 0 otherwise
We then estimate a probit specification where the dependent variable is Pjk. The spec-
ification includes a rich set of household and community characteristics as explanatory
variables.
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4. 5. Results
4.0.3. The Decision to Give to an International Aid Organization
Table 3 displays the baseline probit regression model using the data on private giving to
international aid available in the PSID. We first examine only individual and household
variables and their eﬀect on private giving to international aid. The dependent variable is
equal to one if a household contributes money to an international aid organization, and 0
otherwise. The estimates in the first column of Table 2A are marginal probit coeﬃcients;
in the second column we report heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors adjusted for
county-level clustering of residuals.
From the results, a picture of the household-level determinants of contributions to inter-
national aid organizations emerges. Higher income households (measured by log permanent
income) are more likely to contribute to charitable organizations.
Consistent with other studies on charitable giving, we find that there are significant
life-cycle eﬀects in private income redistribution. The incidence of private giving to interna-
tional aid increases with age but eventually declines among older households. Male-headed
households are about 0.4 percentage points less likely to give to international aid organiza-
tions compared to female-headed households. Educational attainment and household size
are positively associated with giving to an international aid organization. An additional year
of education increases the likelihood of private redistribution by about 2 percentage points.
Interestingly, being nonwhite measured by a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if household
head is nonwhite does not have a statistically significant impact on the probability of giving
to an international aid organization. Using the PSID data set, we find that immigrant
households and female-headed households are more likely to contribute to international aid
organizations and to the provision of global public goods. Both the incidence and levels
of transfers increase with age but eventually decline. Being college-educated is associated
with a 4 percentage point increase in the likelihood of contributing to an international aid
organizations.
4.0.4. Support for Public International Aid
While the PSID provides insights into the determinants of private support of international
aid, we also use additional data on private attitudes towards public funding towards inter-
national redistribution. These results are presented in Table 3 (column 2). When we turn
our attention to the GSS data set, we find some similarities between private contributions
and preferences for public funding for international aid. Immigrant households, female-
headed households and college graduates are more likely to support greater funding for
international aid consistent with their attitudes towards private giving. However, we also
note some diﬀerences. Non-white households are about 5 percentage points more likely to
support increased funding for international assistance. Higher income households are less
likely to support increased public funding for international aid. Because the GSS data has
limited information on household income, we consider several additional controls that cap-
ture a household’s permanent income. We note that the results on household variables are
robust to the inclusion of controls for religious aﬃliation, location dummies and occupation
dummies.
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The coeﬃcients on individual and household controls are very stable and robust to
diﬀerent specifications. Therefore, in the interest of space from now on we will not report
them, although it should be noted that they are included in all the specifications. We
now turn to examine the impact of community characteristics including the fraction of the
foreign born on support for international aid.
4.1. The Impact of Community Characteristics on International Redistribution
In Table 4, we present include county population and median income (both measured in
logs) together with the measures of foreign born population. Consistent with the theoretical
predictions, the share of the foreign born has a positive and statistically significant eﬀect on
the probability of private giving to international aid organizations. We find the results on
share of the foreign born to be sizeable, when compared to other significant determinants of
contributions. The inclusion of county-level variables does not change signs and significance
of individual controls (not shown).
Ethnic diversity index has been criticized in the literature because it has the same
value for each individual living in the same community, and therefore may not accurately
reflect the eﬀects of interpersonal preferences–preferences that depend on the ethnic char-
acteristics of others residing in a specific community. Interpersonal preferences will depend
on the interplay between an individual’s own ethnic identity and ethnicity of others. To
deal with this concern, we include variable SHARE which is the share of households from
a given individual’s own ethnic group in total population as an alternate measure of ethnic
diversity. This variable is household-specific and will allow us to test whether households
are more likely to contribute when the share of their own ethnic group in total population
increases.
We find SHARE to have a positive and significant eﬀect on contributions suggesting
that interpersonal preferences may constitute an important channel through which ethnic
diversity aﬀect private redistribution. We should note that nonwhite dummy variable is no
longer significant in this regression when we include the share of one’s ethnic community
in the county’s population. However, the signs and significance of all other individual and
household controls remain the same (individual controls not shown in Table 2b). This result
suggests that perhaps what is important is not the ethnicity of the individual per se but the
relationship between the ethnicity of the individual and ethnic make-up of the community.
One could argue that ethnic diversity reflects other types of diversity such as income
inequality within a community. The existing literature suggests that income or wealth
inequality can aﬀect incentives to contribute to the community organization (LaFerrara,
2001). To rule out this interpretation of the results, we control for income diversity at the
community-level using the Gini coeﬃcient index. The Gini coeﬃcient index was constructed
using 2000 Census data at the county level. We find that income inequality has a negative
but insignificant association with the probability of giving to the needy. It is important
to note that controlling for both income inequality and ethnic diversity measures does not
change the results (not shown).
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4.1.1. Do Other Community Characteristics Matter?
The results on household and community variables appear comparable to earlier results for
probit. In particular, the ethnic diversity index has a negative and significant impact on
the amount of contributions. The share of population from household’s own ethnic group
(SHARE) has a positive and significant eﬀect on the amount of contributions. We find that
income inequality is again negative, but not statistically significant.
In Table 4, we include county population and median income (both measured in logs)
together with the fraction of the foreign born in the county. We find the results on fraction
of the foreign born to be sizeable, when compared to other significant determinants of
contributions. The inclusion of county-level variables does not change signs and significance
of individual controls (not shown).
From the results on community characteristics, the share of the foreign born has a posi-
tive and significant eﬀect on contributions to international aid organizations suggesting that
interpersonal preferences may constitute an important channel through which community
characteristics aﬀect private redistribution. In contrast, the log population and median
income in the county of residence do not have a significant impact on private contributions
to international aid organizations.
One could argue that fraction of the foreign born reflects other types of diversity such
as income inequality within a community. The existing literature suggests that income or
wealth inequality can aﬀect incentives to contribute to the community organization (LaFer-
rara, 2001). To rule out this interpretation of the results, we control for income diversity
at the community-level using the Gini coeﬃcient index. The Gini coeﬃcient index was
constructed using 2000 Census data at the county level. We find that income inequality
has a negative but insignificant association with the probability of giving to international
aid organizations. It is important to note that controlling for both income inequality and
ethnic diversity measures does not change the results (not shown).
Determinants of Support for Public International Aid
In Table 4, we also present results from the GSS on the community-level determinants
of support for international aid. The results on community variables appear comparable
to earlier results for private giving to international aid organizations. In particular, the
share of the foreign born has a positive and significant impact on the likelihood that a
given individual supports increased public international aid. We find that both log median
income and log population do not have a statistically significant impact on support for
public international aid.
Government Transfers
We now turn to discuss results that include perceptions of government transfers ob-
tained from the GSS. These results are important for two reasons. First, these theoretical
framework presented earlier suggests that individuals may consider government transfers
in their private redistribution decision. An extensive literature investigates the impact of
government transfers on private transfer behavior. In general, empirical studies generally
report small estimates of crowding out (Okten and Weisbrod; 2000; Ribar and Wilhelm;
2001). In recent work, Hungerman (2005) finds relatively large estimates of crowd out us-
ing data on religious giving. One advantage of his approach is that it is possible to link
charitable activity to data on government transfers to specific organizations.
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A second reason for including government transfers is that this allows us to further
explore the importance of omitted variables. Specifically, if perceptions of government
international assistance are correlated with unobservables at the community level, then
including this variable will
To measure perceptions of government funding toward international assistance, we use
county-level data on the fraction of respondents in the GSS that report that the U.S. is
spending “too much” on international assistance. Table 5 column 1 presents this regression.
Marginal probit coeﬃcients are presented. We do not find any evidence for crowding out.
In fact, the measure of perceptions of government transfers is negative and statistically
insignificant.
The positive coeﬃcient may seem puzzling at first. But we recognize that a higher
government transfers may also reflect the severity of needs in a community. If we cannot
fully control for the existence of such needs with the share of poor in population variable,
then we might observe a positive association with government food stamp expenditure and
private giving. Ethnic diversity remains negative and significant while share of poor in
population is insignificant. WHAT ABOUT LEVELS?
Interpersonal Preferences
It is challenging to isolate the exact mechanisms through which the foreign born in the
population aﬀect household behavior. One mechanism that we will consider in more detail
is through interpersonal preferences. Here we will take a similar approach to Luttmer (2001)
who examines the eﬀect of interpersonal preferences on support for welfare spending. More
specifically, we construct two variables that capture the distribution of foreign born by
region of origin.
[Insert Table 5]
Do the foreign born really matter?
Although the results on the foreign born provide important insights, there is a need for
caution in the interpretation of these results. In general, isolating the impact of community-
level outcomes on social and economic outcomes can be challenging. Since it is unlikely that
individuals randomly chose their county of residence, estimates of the impact of the foreign
born on giving to international causes may be biased. An important concern in the analysis
is that the location decision could be shaped by the same unobserved factors that influence
the decision to give. To illustrate this point, suppose an individual who is more generous is
also more likely to reside in a community with a higher fraction of the foreign born. The
omission of individual variables (taste for giving, generosity) from the analysis may lead
us to find a spurious “foreign born eﬀect”. Another concern is that individuals residing
within a given geographical area often share a common economic environment, and some
of these factors are unobserved in the analysis. For example, there may be higher levels
of government spending on public goods. In future work, plan to address some of these
issues. For example, we can control for the role of time-invariant unmeasured community
characteristics using MSA fixed-eﬀects. We also examine changes in charitable giving over
time to reduce concerns about the eﬀect of unobserved diversity at the individual level.
Discussion: The Taste for International Redistribution vs Alternative explanations
The results suggest that as the fraction of the foreign born in a community rises house-
holds are more likely to give to international aid organizations and also support greater
public international assistance.
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Donating to international aid organizations which provide development assistance is
essentially a private act of redistribution of income. Studies before us focused on the deter-
minants of public acts of income redistribution. These studies noted that relatively homo-
geneous areas tend to have more income redistribution and other forms of public spending
(Alesina et al., 1999; Easterly and Levine, 1997; Orr, 1976; Poterba, 1997). Luttmer (2001)
noted that if individuals prefer to redistribute to their own racial, ethnic or religious group,
they prefer less redistribution when members of their own group constitute a smaller share
of beneficiaries.
There is less support for political trust arguments, which emphasise that the eﬃcacy of
political decision-making institutions promotes beliefs about trust in the state and views
on government responsibilities.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Charitable organizations play a central role in redistributing income to the needy, giving
to may be linked to social capital formation and co-operative behavior (Putnam, 1993;
Knack and Keefer, 1997). Using new data on private income redistribution, we find that an
increase in the share of the foreign born has a positive eﬀect on private giving to international
aid organizations. The main findings are suggestive of mechanisms through which foreign
born can influence contributions. Specifically, we find that altruism towards one’s ethnic
group may aﬀect giving to needy. We do not find any evidence for crowding out from
government transfers.
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